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Consumers need information to compare alternatives for markets to function efficiently. Recognizing
this, public policies often pair competition with easy access to comparative information. The implicit
assumption is that comparison friction—the wedge between the availability of comparative information
and consumers’ use of it—is inconsequential because information is readily available and consumers
will access this information and make effective choices. We examine the extent of comparison friction
in the market for Medicare Part D prescription drug plans in the United States. In a randomized field
experiment, an intervention group received a letter with personalized cost information. That information
was readily available for free and widely advertised. However, this additional step—providing the
information rather than having consumers actively access it—had an impact. Plan switching was 28
percent in the intervention group, versus 17 percent in the comparison group, and the intervention
caused an average decline in predicted consumer cost of about $100 per year among letter recipients—roughly
5 percent of the cost in the comparison group. Our results suggest that comparison friction can be large
even when the cost of acquiring information is small, and may be relevant for a wide range of public
policies that incorporate consumer choice.
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Government services increasingly rely on consumer choice. For instance, the design of the 
largest new social program of the last decade, Medicare Part D prescription drug insurance, relies 
heavily on consumers making choices. Choice is a key feature of Social Security privatizations 
and proposed school voucher programs. The rationale for including choice and competition is 
straightforward. Individuals have heterogeneous preferences and choice allows them to opt for 
services that best match their preferences. Competition between providers then facilitates a menu 
of services being provided at the cost-efficient frontier. In the best case, consumers get services 
that fit their needs better and governments save money.  
This best case requires that consumers be able to look at the menu of options and pick the 
one that most cost effectively matches their needs. Making such choices requires having 
informed consumers. Yet, service providers may not provide all relevant information voluntarily. 
When service providers have information relevant to choices that consumers do not, this 
information asymmetry can undercut the benefits of choice and competition. As a result, 
policymakers frequently pair choice mechanisms with transparency systems—such as public 
school report cards, nutritional labeling, toxic pollution reporting, auto safety and fuel economy 
ratings, and corporate financial reporting (Weil et al. 2006)—all intended to make comparative 
information readily available.  
Simply making information available, however, does not ensure consumers will use it. We 
call comparison friction the wedge between the availability of comparative information and 
consumers’ use of it. (It is analogous to search friction—the challenge for buyers and sellers in 
locating each other.) Traditionally, public policies assume that comparison friction is largely 2 
 
inconsequential as long as comparative data is provided for free and the benefits from comparing 
are non-negligible.  
This study estimates the effect of reducing comparison friction in the market for prescription 
drug insurance plans for senior citizens. Over a period of about two and a half years, we 
followed the choices made by seniors who participated in an experiment we designed that 
reduced comparison friction by delivering personalized cost information to seniors via a letter. 
That personalized information used aspects of the match between consumers and the available 
plans (specifically, the differences in out-of-pocket costs of the drugs an individual takes) that 
could be readily observed.  
One group of seniors—the intervention group—was presented with personalized price 
information created by entering their drug data into Medicare’s Plan Finder website. They saw 
the cost of all plans for their personal drug profile as well as how much they would save by 
switching to the lowest-cost plan. A comparison group was given only the address of this 
website. The distinction between the groups was that the comparison group had to actively visit a 
website (or call Medicare’s toll-free number, or seek information from a third party), whereas the 
intervention group had information delivered to them. We concentrate specifically on people 
who enrolled in a plan, and examine the effects of comparison friction on the choice of plan 
during an open enrollment period at the end of a year and on the plan selected for the coming 
year. 
The intervention was designed to reduce comparison friction related to expected cost of 
plans. Other forms of comparison friction related to differences in uncertainty about costs or 
about requirements insurers might have for obtaining medication were not addressed. The 3 
 
transaction costs of taking action and deciding to switch plans (involving a phone call) were 
relatively low.  
We found large effects of this simple intervention. The intervention group switched plans 28 
percent of the time, whereas the comparison group only did so 17 percent of the time. The 
average cost savings of the intervention—across the entire intervention group including non-
switchers—was about $100 per year, or about 5 percent of the average predicted cost for the 
comparison group. We did not find effects on potential variability of consumer costs or on plan 
quality, although our power to do so was limited. The effects on consumer cost appeared to 
persist over time, although those estimates are imprecise. The intervention encouraged some 
individuals to switch to the lowest-cost plan and some to switch to other lower-cost plans. 
Although our sample included a larger proportion of college graduates and of people dissatisfied 
with their plans than a nationally representative sample would have, estimates of the effects for 
non-college graduates and for people satisfied with their plans ($129 and $74, respectively) were 
substantial. We estimate that our sample had larger potential savings in dollars—and similar 
savings in percentage terms—from switching to the lowest-cost plan than a national sample 
would have. The effects of the intervention for individuals below and above $400 in potential 
savings were similar in relative terms (0.052 and 0.075 log points, respectively). Overall, the 
effects in these subgroups suggest that the results have broader applicability in a range of settings 
beyond that of the experiment itself. 
These results fit into a set of recent studies that focus on comparison friction, such as those 
that examine the effect of the Internet in reducing comparison friction in markets where 
government plays a relatively minor role. (For example, see Brynjolfsson and Smith, 2000; Scott 
Morton, Zettelmeyer and Silva-Risso, 2001; Brown and Goolsbee, 2002; and Ellison and Ellison, 4 
 
2009.) Hastings and Weinstein (2008), in a study of school choice where government plays a 
major role, found parents were more likely to choose a school with higher average test scores 
after receiving difficult to gather publicly available information about school scores. Moreover, 
children improved their own test scores after attending a higher-scoring school. A key difference 
between that study and ours is that the information provided in that study was plausibly hard to 
gather. In our context, the comparative data was relatively easy to acquire.  Our results as a 
whole suggest that comparison friction could be effectively large even when the cost of acquiring 
information is low. This is consistent with other findings in contexts ranging from finance to 
nutrition to health where people have often failed to make use of comparative information that is 
readily available (Fung, Graham, and Weil, 2007).  The findings have implications for a wide 
range of public policies that incorporate consumer choice. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section II provides a very brief background on 
Medicare Part D. Section III presents a conceptual framework for our analysis of plan choices. 
Section IV describes our data sources. Section V uses several of these sources (a cross-sectional 
survey and several audits of information sources) to characterize demand for and supply of 
information and knowledge of Medicare drug plans, and provide context for the experimental 
analyses. Section VI describes the experiment and presents results. Section VII discusses their 
interpretation. Section VIII discusses directions for future research. 
 
II. MEDICARE PART D 
  The Medicare Part D prescription drug benefit was established as part of the Medicare 
Modernization Act of 2003, with coverage first beginning in January 2006. The drug benefit was 
subsidized, with Medicare paying about three-quarters of the premium. At the outset and again at 5 
 
the end of each year during an open enrollment period, individuals typically chose from among 
40-60 plans, depending upon where they lived.  
  Costs of plans included a monthly premium common to all beneficiaries of that plan and a 
personalized component that depended upon use. Under a standard plan for 2007 for drugs on the 
plan’s formulary of covered medications, individuals paid 100% of the first $265 of total costs 
(determined by the quantity of prescriptions and their full prices negotiated by the plan), 25% of 
total costs $266-$2400, 100% of total costs above $2400 until own out of pocket costs reached 
$3850. Above the $3850 threshold, individuals paid either $2.15 for a 30 day supply of generics 
and $5.35 for brand name drugs, or 5% of further total costs– whichever was greater.  
  Most insurers offered two or three plans, including one actuarially equivalent to the standard 
plan and one or two with higher premiums and more cost sharing. Some plans had cost-sharing 
over the initial range (that is, no deductible) and some had cost sharing over the middle range 
(that is, offered some coverage through the coverage gap known as the “doughnut hole”). Still 
other variants had cost sharing in the form of a fixed price per prescription (co-payments with 
amounts depending upon the specific tier into which the plan had classified a drug) rather than as 
a percentage of the cost.
1 Actuarially equivalent plans (61 percent of enrollees in standalone 
plans nationally in 2006) used one or more of these variants as an alternative benefit design that 
covered the same share of enrollees’ drug costs, on average, as the standard benefit (18 percent 
                                            
1 For example, Humana Insurance Company offered three standalone prescription drug plans (PDPs) in 2007. 
Humana PDP Standard had a premium that differed by state, ranging from $10.20 to $18.20 per month, and used 
exactly the same cost sharing as the standard plan described above. Humana PDP Enhanced had a premium ranging 
from $17.10 to $27.50 per month. There was no deductible, and the costs were: $5 for a 30 day supply of preferred 
generic drugs; $30 for a 30 day supply of preferred brand drugs; $60 for a 30 day supply of other non-preferred 
drugs; 25% coinsurance for a 30 day supply of specialty drugs; $15 for a 90 day retail supply of preferred generic 
drugs ($12.50 mail order); $90 for a 90 day retail supply of preferred brand drugs ($75 mail order); $180 for a 90 
day supply of other non-preferred drugs ($150 mail order). After the total yearly drug costs (paid by the individual 
and the plan) reached $2,400, the individual paid 100% of costs until own out of pocket costs reached $3850, at 
which point there was the same catastrophic coverage cost sharing as with the standard plan. Humana Complete had 
a monthly premium ranging from $69.50 to $88.40 per month, and differed from the Enhanced plan only in that it 
provided cost sharing in the coverage gap: $5 for a 30 day supply of preferred generic drugs, and $15 for a 90 day 
supply of preferred generic drugs.  6 
 
of enrollees). Enhanced plans (20 percent of enrollees) covered a greater share of the drug costs, 
often using some cost sharing in the doughnut hole. 
  Insurers had different coverage of drugs and dosage forms (known as the formulary), which 
sometimes differed among plans offered by insurers. The insurers differed along a variety of 
other dimensions (that generally did not vary among plans offered by insurers), such as 
utilization management tools (prior authorization, step therapy, quantity limitations), pharmacy 
accessibility, mail order discounts, customer service, and financial stability of insurer.
2 
  Medicare beneficiaries were offered the opportunity to voluntarily enroll in drug coverage 
either through a standalone plan (complementing fee-for-service health insurance through 
Medicare) or through a Medicare Advantage plan (often a health maintenance organization). 
This study focuses on individuals who were enrolled in standalone prescription drug plans in 
2006 (the first year the benefit was offered) and were not receiving low-income subsidies. 
Nationally, this group was about 8 million of 43 million seniors (MedPAC 2007). 
  During an open enrollment period from November 15 to December 31 in 2006 (and similarly 
in subsequent years), individuals could switch plans. Prior to this period, individuals received a 
Medicare and You handbook, which contained fourteen pages describing Part D plans and 
answering frequently asked questions. The handbook indicated that one could switch plans by 
calling the plan that one wanted to join, or by calling 800-MEDICARE. The handbook included 
one page with a list of plans offered in one’s state, with information on the monthly premium, 
benefit type (basic, enhanced without gap, enhanced with gap), and the percentage of the 100 
most common drugs that are covered by the plan. 
                                            
2 For example, all three Humana plans in 2007 used the same pharmacy network and mail order system, and covered 
the same drugs using the same formulary with the same utilization management. 7 
 
  There are several reasons to suspect substantial comparison friction in Part D plan selection. 
For example, Heiss, McFadden, and Winter (2006) found that about 70 percent of seniors agreed 
with the statement “There were too many alternative plans to choose from” and more than half 
had difficulty understanding how Medicare Part D worked and what savings to expect. Earlier 
research has found that seniors have difficulty navigating insurance choices within Medicare 
(Gold, Achman, and Brown 2003; Hibbard et al. 2001; McCormack et al. 2001). 
  Recently, a number of authors have examined the quality of seniors’ choices and the effect of 
information in the context of Medicare Part D. Heiss, McFadden, and Winter (2010) used survey 
data and concluded that seniors’ decision to enroll in 2006 responded to incentives provided by 
their health status and the environment but acknowledged that “enrollment is transparently 
optimal for most eligible seniors.” 
  Abaluck and Gruber (2011) examined claims data from 2005 and 2006 and determined that 
most seniors did not choose plans on an efficient frontier, defined in terms of expected cost and 
its variance. In addition, relative to a rational model of choice, seniors placed more weight on 
plan premiums than on out-of-pocket costs, placed weight on plan’s financial characteristics (e.g. 
the presence of a deductible) independent of the effect of those characteristics on their own costs, 
and showed unexpectedly low levels of risk aversion—all behaviors that contradict a rational, 
normative model of plan choice. 
  Based on an analysis of two years of panel data, Ketcham et al.(2010) found that seniors 
reduced their out-of-pocket costs for insurance and prescription drugs above the cost of their 
cheapest ex-post alternative between 2006 and 2007, although this improvement came both from 
active decisions to change plans and convergence among plans. Using a laboratory experiment, 
Bundorf and Szrek (2010) reported that both the benefits and costs of choice increase with the 8 
 
number of options available. In another laboratory experiment, Hanoch et al. (2009) found that 
participants were less likely to correctly identify the plan that minimized total cost when 
presented with larger numbers of plans. Taken together, these results suggest some potential for 
choice errors, particularly for more difficult choices, in newer situations, and for less able 




III. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
To visualize the choice problem facing the individual, we focus on three decisions. We 
define the following random variables representing the distribution of potential realizations for 
each individual: 
     
   is the potential benefit to the individual i from plan j minus switching costs;  
        is the component of potential consumer cost for plan j that can be predicted from 
comparative research (based on extrapolations of last year’s drug use); and 
   ̃   is the component of potential consumer cost for plan j that cannot be predicted from 
comparative research. 
We assume a utility function for increments to the utility from current consumption from 
participating in a plan, such that               
             ̃    and marginal utility is decreasing in its 
arguments. Also,    is the comparison friction—specifically, each individual’s known cost of 
undertaking comparative research about the costs of plans (expressed in the same units as      ). 
                                            
3 Other research on Part D has examined the market structure and plan dimensions, such as the incentives that exist 
for adverse selection (Goldman, Joyce, and Vogt, 2011), prices for branded drugs (Duggan and Scott Morton, 2011), 
and welfare impacts of limiting the number of Part D plans (Lucarelli, Prince, and Simon, 2008). The cost 
management strategies do appear to have encouraged people to switch to cheaper medications (Neuman et al. 2007). 
Utilization has increased, while seniors’ expenditures have decreased (Yin et al. 2008). About one-third of new 
public expenditure has crowded out previous private expenditure (Engelhardt and Gruber, forthcoming).  9 
 
III.A. Plan Choice Without Research 
Without research, the highest level of expected utility across all plans, taking the expectation 
over the joint distribution of all the random variables that determine       is given in equation (1). 
(1)     
   m a x            
If research is not undertaken, then the plan j that maximizes expected utility in equation (1) will 
be selected—and if this is the current plan, the individual will not switch plans.  
III.B. Plan Choice With Research  
If research is undertaken,     is a realization of      . The highest level of expected utility 
across all plans is then given in equation (2), where    is additively separable from       for 
simplicity of exposition. The individual selects the plan j that maximizes this expression.  
(2)     
     ,    ,…,      m a x                            
III.C. Deciding to Undertake Research  
The decision to undertake research involves comparing   
  to the expected value of   
  when 
the predictable cost component is uncertain (because research has not yet been undertaken). This 
expected value is shown in equation (3), taken over the joint distribution of the predictable cost 
component of all plans and the cost of comparative research for an individual.  
(3)     
        
       ,     ,…,        
The individual undertakes research if the expected value of the maximum expected utility from 
undertaking research is greater than the maximum expected utility from the plan that would be 
chosen without research (  
      
 ) and does not otherwise. The key conceptual distinction 
between   
  and   
  is that   
  captures the option value of comparative research. That is, if the 10 
 
research could reveal substantial predicted savings from a plan, then paying a small cost of 
research tends to be worthwhile.
4 
III.D. Implications 
Because research reduces uncertainty about costs, we would expect plan choices based on 
research to be more sensitive to cost differences than those made without research. Thus, we 
would expect an intervention that reduced the cost of comparative research to cause individuals 
to put more weight on cost (as a random variable with lower variance in their expected utility 
calculation) when evaluating plans—which would tend to reduce potential consumer cost of 
selected plans.  
When    is reduced for some individuals, we would expect more people to undertake research 
and switching plans would be worthwhile for more people. However, the magnitude of the effect 
of the intervention on potential consumer cost is not necessarily determined by the magnitude of 
   because the cost savings must be sufficient to compensate for switching costs.  
 
IV. DATA SOURCES 
Several sources of data were used for this paper. A national phone survey of Part D 
beneficiaries was fielded to understand their knowledge of and experience with Medicare drug 
plans and their sources of information. An audit of potential sources of information was 
undertaken to understand the information available to them. A sample of pharmacy claims data 
was obtained to examine the potential savings available to beneficiaries who could change plans. 
                                            
4 For example, assume there are only two plans—one is the current plan and a second is an alternative. Without 
research, assume the alternative has an equal chance of having large predicted savings on average (yielding X) or 
large predicted cost on average (yielding -Y) such that its expected utility (0.5X - 0.5Y) is negative. Under these 
conditions, the alternative will not be selected over the current plan. However, it will be worthwhile to do research 
that will reveal whether the plan will result in utility of X or -Y if the combination of utility from predicted savings 
X and the zero utility change from staying with the current plan is greater than the cost of the research—that is, 
(  
      
 ) when (0.5X + 0.5*0 – r ≥ 0). 11 
 
And a field experiment was conducted in which some beneficiaries received a personalized letter 
about drug plan choice, while others received general information. 
IV.A. National Phone Survey 
We commissioned a phone survey of Medicare beneficiaries over age 65 who were enrolled 
in stand-alone Medicare prescription drug plans. The survey was fielded in February and March 
2007. A market research firm generated an initial sample of phone numbers; these numbers were 
intended to reach seniors with high probability and, ultimately, to generate a nationally 
representative sample of seniors. 26 percent of people reached by phone agreed to begin the 
survey. Of these, 49 percent did not meet screening criteria, 8 percent did not complete the 
survey, and 43 percent were both eligible and completed the survey. An additional 13 percent of 
respondents were removed from the sample due to incomplete data, leading to 348 responses. 
IV.B. Audit of Information Sources 
Actors, hired by the researchers, made 12 calls to Medicare, 5 calls to State Health Insurance 
Programs (SHIPs), 88 in-person visits to Boston area pharmacies (stratified by 
chain/independent/retail, urban/suburban, and community income), 8 in-person visits to Boston-
area senior centers, and 12 calls to other help-lines, identified via an internet search, during the 
open enrollment period in December 2006. For the in-person audits, an actor, aged 
approximately 65, posed as a Medicare beneficiary and asked for advice about choosing a drug 
plan using a set of questions developed by the research team. For the phone audit, a research 
assistant, posing as a relative of a Medicare beneficiary, asked these same questions.  12 
 
IV.C. Sample of Pharmacy Claims 
We derived drug profiles for 59 seniors with Medicare drug plans from the 2006 claims of a 
large pharmacy chain’s stores in one state. For 41 of these seniors, we identified a sponsor but 
not a plan. For these individuals, we calculated costs for the lowest- and the highest-cost plan 
among those offered by the sponsor. Cost measures were then created using the Medicare Plan 
Finder website to compare costs of selected plans and the lowest-cost plans. The pharmacy data 
is likely missing some data on prescriptions that the individual filled at other pharmacies; a 
countervailing factor is that some individuals with insurance but without prescription use are 
omitted from the sample by construction.   
IV.D. Experimental Intervention 
The experiment and associated data collection consisted of three surveys and one mailing. A 
baseline phone survey was conducted in November 2006. A letter intervention was mailed in 
December 2006. Two follow-up phone surveys were fielded: one in April and May of 2007 and 
one in March and April of 2008.  
Patients of the University of Wisconsin Hospital system age 65 and over made up the 
sample frame. Letters of invitation were mailed to 5,873 subjects who were then contacted by 
phone. Approximately half of those agreed to join the study. Of these, approximately 15 percent 
met screening criteria, and reported a plan name that could be later matched to the Medicare Plan 
Finder, leading to a baseline sample size of 451.  
In the baseline survey, the participants answered detailed questions about their prescription 
drug use and basic questions about personal characteristics. Researchers constructed measures of 
beneficiary costs in each respondent’s current drug plan and in all available drug plans by 
entering the respondent’s drug utilization information into the Medicare Plan Finder website. 13 
 
After baseline data were collected, participants were randomly assigned to intervention and 
comparison groups. Each participant received a personalized mailing. The materials participants 
received are shown in the Appendix.  
The 2007 follow-up inquired about the plan chosen for 2007 and the choice process. 406 
people completed the baseline survey, were randomly assigned in the experiment, and completed 
the 2007 follow-up survey—forming our main analytic sample—and 45 people completed the 
baseline survey and were assigned to the experiment but could not be reached for follow-up. 
Thus, although about half of those sent a letter of invitation did not agree to participate (which is 
relevant for external validity), the study does include 90 percent of people randomly assigned to 
a group in the experiment (which is particularly relevant for internal validity of the results from 
the experiment). 92 percent of intervention group and 88 percent of comparison group completed 
the 2007 follow-up survey.  
The 2008 follow-up collected data on drugs used in 2007 and 2008, experiences in the 2007 
plan, and the plan chosen for 2008.
5 305 of those 406 people completing the 2007 follow-up 
survey also completed the 2008 follow-up survey.   
Data on actual plan enrollment in 2007 (from the 2007 follow-up survey) and 2008 (from 
the 2008 follow-up survey) was used to determine when individuals had switched plans. To 
assess the dispersion in costs across plans for the same individuals, we compiled data on the 
predicted and actual costs of every possible plan. Predicted cost for 2007 is the estimated annual 
cost measure computed by the Medicare Plan Finder for a given drug plan based on an 
individual’s prescription drug use as reported at the time of random assignment in fall 2006. The 
                                            
5 In order to construct cost measures, because the 2007 Medicare Plan Finder was no longer available in 2008, 
researchers entered respondents’ reported 2007 drug utilization into a 2007 version of a private-sector counterpart of 
the Medicare Plan Finder, the Experion Plan Prescriber. The Plan Finder was used to construct cost measures for 
2008, and tests based on the 2008 releases of both tools demonstrated a high-level of agreement (>90 percent). 14 
 
Plan Finder computed the out-of-pocket cost for each plan, assuming that the drugs entered 
would be taken for the full year of 2007 and that chemically-equivalent generic drugs would be 
substituted for brand-name drugs. Actual realized cost for 2007 is the estimated annual cost 
measure computed by the Medicare Plan Finder for a given drug plan based on an individual’s 
prescription drug use throughout 2007 (with dosages prorated to reflect that cumulative use) as 
reported at the time of the second follow-up survey in 2008. Predicted cost for 2008 and for 2009 
is based on current drug use as reported in the 2008 follow-up survey.  
 
V. CHOICE ENVIRONMENT 
  We used our phone survey to assess the context within which seniors made choices about 
whether or not to change prescription drug plans during open enrollment. A significant majority 
of respondents knew that different plans were better for different people (82 percent) and that 
they could only change plans during open enrollment (74 percent). (See Table I.) However, few 
had learned additional facts about the specific differences among plans. Only 37 percent knew 
that only some (rather than all) plans have a deductible. Only 55 percent knew that different 
plans have different co-payments for generic drugs, rather than all plans having the same co-
payments.
6 
  We found that over 80 percent of respondents were generally satisfied with their 2006 
prescription drug plans. The percentage that switched plans between 2006 and 2007 was 10 
percent, slightly above the reported national rate of seven percent.
7 An additional 14 percent 
considered switching for 2007 but did not switch, which is consistent with the high levels of 
                                            
6 In survey data collected in 2005, just prior to the beginning of the first open enrollment period, Winter et al. (2006) 
also found low knowledge about the structure of the benefit and the potential for differences among plans. 
7 That national rate is for those not receiving the Low Income Subsidy (U.S. Department of Health and Human 




  The leading sources of information that participants used to learn about drug plans were 
mailings from plans and mailings from Medicare. That material is not personalized and does not 
convey transparent information about out-of-pocket costs. The more interactive forms of 
information gathering, such as in-person, phone, or internet, were each used by less than 15 
percent of respondents. Eighteen percent reviewed personalized plan comparisons.
9 
  To better understand the information available in the existing choice environment and the 
costs of acquiring it, we audited five potential sources of advice on choosing a drug plan: the 
Medicare help-line (1-800-Medicare), state health insurance assistance programs (SHIPs), senior 
centers, other telephone help-lines, and retail pharmacies. In our calls to 1-800-Medicare, 
customer service representatives consistently entered personalized drug information, identified a 
low cost plan, and offered to enroll the caller—drawing upon Medicare’s website tool, the 
Prescription Drug Plan Finder. Our calls to SHIPs generated either referrals to Medicare or offers 
of similar assistance. Our visits to senior centers sometimes resulted in general discussions about 
the drug benefit or partial demonstrations of the Medicare website but never in comparative 
information left in the hands of the auditor. A search for and audit of other sources of telephone 
advice indicated that few private-sector information sources had emerged.
10 In general, these 
sources were either not helpful or referred the caller to Medicare or another public-sector 
                                            
8 Our survey results are similar to Heiss, McFadden, and Winter (2010), who reported that 82 percent rated their 
2006 plan good or better, 18 percent considered switching for 2007 but did not, and 11 percent switched plans from 
2006 to 2007. Unpublished results from the same survey used in that research indicated that 60 percent did not 
consider switching because they were happy with their plan while 18 percent “wanted to avoid the trouble of going 
through the plan comparison and choice process again.”  
9 Our results are broadly consistent with the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (2007), which reported 
results from a survey in January 2007 indicating that 85 percent of seniors were aware of the open enrollment 
period, 50 percent reviewed their current coverage, 34 percent compared plans, and 17 percent evaluated premiums, 
co-payments, and coverage. 
10 A contributing factor may be Medicare policies, motivated by concerns about conflicts of interest that restrict the 
extent to which third parties can provide advice.  16 
 
information source. In one noteworthy exception (a major pharmacy chain), the help-line offered 
personalized suggestions, using technology similar to Medicare’s, and mailed a personalized 
report.
11 
  A small fraction of pharmacies offered personalized in-store assistance with plan choice to 
auditors who walked in. In four of the 88 pharmacies audited, staff people made personalized 
plan suggestions based on a Plan Finder. In five pharmacies (all in one chain), a staff person 
offered personalized plan information about the entire universe of available plans. Sixty-nine of 
the 88 pharmacies provided print materials. (Separately, tests we gave to recipients of print 
materials indicated that these materials alone were not sufficient for seniors to understand the 
cost implications of plan choice even in very simple cases.) 
  In sum, seniors could acquire personalized assistance from Medicare with minimal effort, but 
seniors who sought information through other channels were not consistently assisted or even 
consistently directed to Medicare. Personalized information was readily available but not widely 
diffused. 
 
VI. INTERVENTION IN THE CHOICE ENVIRONMENT 
To examine the extent to which a reduction in comparison friction would affect plan choices, 
we designed a randomized experiment in which the intervention lowered the cost of obtaining 
and processing the information needed to make comparisons. Members of the intervention group 
received a one page cover letter showing (1) the individual’s current plan and its predicted 
annual cost conditional on their personalized drug profile, (2) the lowest-cost plan and its 
                                            
11 In addition, a second major pharmacy chain offered an internet service in conjunction with a technology partner 
specializing in decision support systems. A code was developed to trigger the import of individual medications into 
the partner's Medicare Part D decision tool. Customers and pharmacy staff were able to produce personalized 
Medicare Part D Plan comparisons by entering these codes into the tool. 
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predicted annual cost, (3) the potential savings from switching to the lowest-cost plan, and (4) 
the date of the end of open enrollment. They also received a printout from the Medicare Plan 
Finder including costs and other data on all available plans. The comparison group received a 
general letter referring them to the Medicare website. Both groups received an informational 
booklet on how to use the site. (For examples of these letters and the booklet, see the Appendix). 
The intervention included a recommended default option (the lowest-cost plan), a clear statement 
of that option’s benefits (potential savings), and a deadline. It neither contained difficult to 
acquire information nor reduced the effort required to change plans.  
 
VI.A. Baseline Characteristics 
At the time of the baseline interview, participants reported regularly using an average of five 
and half medications. The study participants were all from Wisconsin, nearly all white, with an 
average age of 75. About two-thirds were women, about two-thirds were married, and about half 
were college graduates (see Table II). Relative to the national population of seniors, study 
participants were typical in terms of age and gender but were more likely to be married and were 
substantially better educated.  
The potential savings from changing plans, as a share of current expenditure, was similar in 
our intervention sample and in our entirely separate sample of pharmacy claims data—
suggesting that the study did not disproportionately attract those who stood to benefit financially 
from changing plans. Specifically, predicted consumer cost could be reduced an average of 30 
percent in our intervention sample by switching to the lowest-cost plan. The corresponding 
reduction was between 24 and 41 percent in the pharmacy claims sample. (The reason for the 
range is that among plans offered by a particular plan sponsor, we could not determine the 18 
 
specific plan currently covering an individual in many instances. The smaller potential savings is 
based on a calculation using the lowest-cost plan among those offered by a sponsor, and the 
larger potential savings is based on imputation from the sponsor’s highest-cost plan.)  
Although the proportional potential savings was similar, the level of expenditure on 
prescription drugs was substantially higher in our intervention sample than samples more 
representative of the general population, including our pharmacy claims and national samples. 
For example, Domino et al. (2008) projected costs under Part D for a nationally representative 
sample deriving medication usage from the Medicare Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS). The 
average 2006 predicted cost in the lowest-cost plan for individuals in the MEPS was $1114, 
which was 30 percent lower than the corresponding 2007 predicted cost of $1593 for the lowest-
cost plans in our intervention sample. That difference is probably due to the intervention sample 
being drawn from a list of patients with recent clinical visits (and tending to have more health 
problems and higher levels of prescription drug use), and also to being from a more recent year.  
Individual characteristics for the 406 individuals with complete data from both the baseline 
survey in 2006 and the 2007 follow-up survey were similar for those assigned to the intervention 
and comparison groups, although the intervention group had a higher fraction age 75 or older and 
a higher fraction whose satisfaction with their 2006 plan was fair or poor.  
 
VI.B. Percentile Rank in Cost of Chosen Plans 
As context for understanding the potential savings from switching plans during open 
enrollment, we examined the percentile rank in cost of chosen plans in the distribution of 
available plans, as calculated based on the medication usage reported in our baseline survey. 
There were 54 Medicare prescription drug plans available to beneficiaries in our Wisconsin 19 
 
sample. The baseline plans initially enrolled in for 2006 by the individuals in our sample were 
nearer the median-cost plan than the lowest-cost plan among all those offered: the average rank 
was at the 39
th percentile. 
To see how the baseline plans compared to other plans of similar benefit type, we grouped 
the plans into three different types. “Basic” included: plans with a deductible, 25 percent cost 
sharing, then a coverage gap, and then catastrophic coverage (known as defined standard plans); 
actuarially equivalent plans with the same deductible as a defined standard plan but a different 
cost sharing structure (known as actuarially equivalent standard plans); and actuarially 
equivalent plans with a reduced or eliminated deductible and a different cost sharing structure 
(known as basic alternative plans). “Enhanced without gap” included plans with actuarial value 
exceeding the defined standard plan and no cost sharing in the coverage gap. “Enhanced with 
gap” included plans with actuarial value exceeding the defined standard plan and with cost 
sharing in the coverage gap (only for generic drugs, except for one plan).  
There is considerable variation in the consumer costs among basic plans, which are identical 
or actuarially equivalent to the standard plan in terms of insurance value. One plan was the 
lowest cost of the basic plans for about half the individuals in our sample, but fourteen different 
plans were the lowest-cost basic plan for others–depending on the drugs they took. On average, 
the baseline plan was at the 38
th percentile of basic plans (among those who reported enrollment 
in a basic plan for 2006 in the baseline survey). For individuals with enhanced plans without gap 
coverage in 2006, the baseline plan was at the 43
rd percentile of predicted consumer costs among 
plans of that type. For those having enhanced plans with gap coverage in 2006, the baseline plan 
was at the 50
th percentile of costs among that type of plan. (For analysis of the differences in 20 
 
dollars of cost between baseline plans and the lowest-cost plans by benefit type, see the 
Appendix.)  
In addition to analysis of percentile rank of predicted costs based on drugs taken in 2006, we 
also examined costs based on the drugs actually taken throughout 2007 as reported in the 2008 
follow-up interview. That percentile was similar—37
th for actual costs versus 39
th for predicted 
costs—when plans of all benefit types were compared. For actual costs among basic plans 
(among people who had that type plan in 2006), the percentile rank of 35
th was slightly higher 
than for predicted costs. Among enhanced plans without and with gap coverage (again, among 
people who had that type of plan in 2006), the percentile ranks were 37
th and 49
th, respectively. 
Thus, it appears that both ex-ante and ex-post there were numerous options for reducing 
consumer costs among all plans and among plans of the same benefit type. 
 
VI.C. Intervention Impacts 
Switching in 2007. 28 percent of those in the group receiving the letter intervention switched 
plans between 2006 and 2007, compared to 17 percent in the comparison group.
12 The difference 
of 11.5 percentage points is found in a simple comparison of means (see Table III).  
We also estimated the effect of the intervention (Z) on plan switching (D) using linear 
regression and controlling for covariates (X) known at the time of random assignment—
including the age and plan rating variables where there were some differences between the 
comparison and intervention groups as discussed above—as in equation (4). 
(4)                   
                                            
12 The switching rate in the comparison group is more than twice as high as the national average, which is likely 
related to the higher rates of drug utilization and the higher plan dissatisfaction in our sample. 21 
 
After regression adjustment, the estimated difference is 9.8 percentage points. The probability of 
such a large difference occurring by chance under the null hypothesis of no effect of the 
intervention is very small, with p-values less than 0.02 for both specifications. People rating their 
baseline plan as fair or poor were ten percentage points more likely switch plans, holding other 
factors constant. The regression-adjusted impact of the intervention on switching is slightly 
lower than the simple comparison of means primarily because of the interaction between those 
marginal effects and the higher baseline prevalence of those low satisfaction ratings in the 
intervention group than in the comparison group. 
The average time spent on all aspects of plan consideration and possible switching was 3 
hours in the comparison group. Exploring seniors’ choice process and knowledge, we found that 
several of the differences between the two groups supported the notion that the intervention 
worked through cognitive channels. These included statistically significantly greater percentages 
of intervention group members later reporting that they remembered receiving the materials, that 
they read them, and that they found them helpful. 
Predicted 2007 Costs. To estimate effects on costs, we used the same approach as in equation 
(4) except with change in cost as the dependent variable. Specifically, the change in cost 
(       ) is the 2007 predicted consumer cost of the plan selected for 2007 minus that cost for the 
baseline plan that had been selected in 2006. The average regression-adjusted decrease in predicted 
cost for the entire intervention group versus the comparison group was $103 (see Table III). 
Expressed in terms of the change relative to 2006, again estimated using the same approach as in 
equation (4) but with log of the relative change in cost [ln    /  )] as the dependent variable, this 
decrease was an average of 0.064 log points. Again, the probability of such a large difference 
occurring by chance under the null hypothesis was less than 0.005. (The average cost change for 22 
 
the entire intervention group versus the comparison group averages over people who were not 
affected by the intervention and those who potentially were affected. Estimates for those affected 
are discussed in the Appendix.)  
Covariates other than the intervention indicator had little power to explain the changes in 
consumer cost between the baseline 2006 plan and the plan selected in 2007. Holding other 
factors constant, the indicator for seven or more medications was associated with a reduction in 
predicted consumer cost of $112, indicating that people with higher levels of medication use 
chose plans in 2007 resulting in larger reductions in predicted consumer costs than people with 
less use. 
Potential Variability of 2007 Costs. Plans differed in the extent to which costs could be 
higher or lower if medication use were to change in the future. To create a measure of that 
potential variability, we used our data on the predicted consumer cost of every plan offered for 
each of the 406 individuals in our sample. For each plan, we then calculated the difference 
between the 90
th and 10
th percentiles of the predicted 2007 consumer cost among individuals that 
reported taking a similar number of medications in the baseline survey. (Specifically, the 
percentiles were calculated within three subsamples: 0-3 medications, 4-6 medications, and 7 or 
more medications.) This approach—similar to that used by Abaluck and Gruber (2011)—
implicitly assumes that the experiences of other members of our sample with similar medication 
use represent the range of potential variability for each individual. Because of the small samples 
sizes used, however, that assumption only holds very roughly, and that measure is also 
imprecise.  
The sample average for that measure of potential variability was about $2900 for the 2006 
plans used at the time of the baseline survey. In analysis of the change in that measure between 23 
 
the 2006 plan and the 2007 plan for each individual, using the same approach as in equation (4), 
potential variability for the intervention group was $10 less than the comparison group (with a 
standard error of $36). Thus, we did not find evidence that the intervention caused individuals to 
switch to plans that had greater potential variability according to this measure.
13 
Actual 2007 Costs. In terms of the impacts on consumer cost as measured for the respondents 
to the 2008 follow-up survey, the predicted 2007 cost was $111 lower for the intervention group 
and the actual cost was $137 lower—although the standard error was 4 times larger for the 
impact on actual cost (see Table IV).
14 In addition to allowing more precise estimation, we 
focused our primary analysis on the predicted 2007 consumer cost of the plan chosen for 2007 
rather than the actual 2007 cost because the predicted cost uses the information set available to 
individuals when they were making their plan choice during open enrollment prior to 2007, 
which corresponds to the predictable component of costs discussed in section III. Also, the 
predicted 2007 cost has less attrition, since it is based on our 2007 follow-up survey.  
Along with having similar impacts for actual and predicted costs, those two measures were 
fairly similar at the individual level. The correlation between the actual cost and the predicted 
cost was 0.68; excluding the three most extreme differences, the correlation between actual and 
predicted costs was 0.79.
15 Comparing the actual and predicted costs of the 2007 plan selected by 
                                            
13 We also used other measures of dispersion, such as the standard deviation and interquartile range, and found 
effects that were also statistically insignificant. 
14 The actual 2007 cost is based on drug list information collected in 2008 (as is the predicted 2008 and 2009 cost), 
whereas predicted 2007 cost uses the 2006 baseline drug list. Since the baseline data is used in the calculation of the 
predicted 2007 cost of both the 2007 and 2006 plans and their difference is used in the estimation, the estimate of 
the effect of the intervention on that outcome is much more precise that the estimates of the effect on the actual 2007 
cost. That is, the outcomes derived from the information collected in 2008 have much more variability in cost that is 
not removed by subtracting the predicted 2007 cost of the 2006 plan. The impacts in log points estimated based on 
the 2008 follow-up survey data also show more instability in magnitude and sign that those based on the 2007 
follow-up survey, consistent with the imprecise nature of those estimates. 
15 In a regression of actual realized cost on predicted consumer cost for the 2007 plan selected (based on drugs taken 
in 2006), adding the demographic characteristics gathered in 2006 (gender, marital status, education, age, number of 
medications, plan satisfaction) to the model increased the R-squared from 0.47 to 0.52, with significant coefficients 
on having seven or more medications and having low plan satisfaction. 24 
 
the individual, the actual cost was an average of $354 higher than predicted cost among 
respondents to our 2008 follow-up survey. In the distribution of differences between actual and 
potential costs, the actual cost was $1872 higher at the 90th percentile, $51 higher at the median, 
and $663 lower at the 10th percentile.
16  
Quality in 2007. Our 2008 follow-up survey also collected self-reported information on 
experiences in the plan during 2007. There were no statistically significant differences in 
satisfaction with non-cost features or in overall plan ratings, although the point estimates go in 
the direction of relatively more dissatisfaction with non-cost features and less dissatisfaction 
overall for the intervention group (see Table IV). Thus, it is possible that individuals chose 
lower-cost plans that had lower quality; we do not have sufficient statistical power to reject a 
hypothesis of small reductions in quality. Analysis of other measures of administrative quality at 
the plan sponsor level showed essentially no impact.  
Switching in 2008. In another assessment of choices from our 2008 follow-up survey, we 
examined whether individuals were sufficiently satisfied with their choices in 2007 to keep them 
for 2008 after receiving another opportunity to switch plans. 23 percent of the comparison group 
switched in 2008, and 20 percent of the intervention group switched—a statistically insignificant 
difference—implying that the intervention group was at least as satisfied as the comparison 
group overall in terms of their revealed preferences. 
Predicted 2008 and 2009 Costs. The impacts on 2008 and 2009 predicted costs were of 
roughly the same magnitude as both the predicted and actual costs for 2007 (see Table IV). Like 
                                            
16 When calculated as an average over all possible plans, rather than the 2007 plan selected by the individual, the 
actual cost was $339 higher than predicted cost. In the distribution of differences, the actual cost was $1888 higher 
at the 90th percentile, $50 higher at the median, and $838 lower at the 10th percentile. In terms of the ratio of the 
actual to the predicted costs, at the 90th percentile the actual was about 90 percent higher, and at the 10th percentile 
the actual was about 30 percent lower. The correlation of the within-person ranks of 2007 actual and predicted cost 
was 0.70. 25 
 
those actual costs, they were imprecisely estimated. We interpret these results as being consistent 
with continued savings over time due to the intervention, but we also could not reject a null 
hypothesis of no impact at conventional levels of statistical significance. 
 
VI.D. Role of the Lowest-Cost Plan 
We found some evidence that more aspects of the intervention mattered for decision-making 
than simply the identification of the lowest-cost plan. The intervention letter sent in the fall of 
2006 named the plan with the lowest predicted consumer cost in 2007, based on reported 
prescription drug use, and gave the predicted cost and calculated the difference in cost relative to 
the 2006 plan. An attachment to the intervention letter also showed the predicted cost of each 
plan. We found that 9 percent of the intervention group switched specifically to the lowest-cost 
plans while 20 percent switched to a different plan; in the comparison group these percentages 
were 2 percent (statistically significantly different from 9 percent) and 15 percent (not 
statistically significantly different from 20 percent). This result is consistent with the idea that 
the intervention specifically caused seniors to consider the lowest-cost plan, and also that seniors 
gave additional consideration to the personalized cost of plans other than the lowest-cost plan. 
As a complement to the analysis of the impact of the intervention on switching rates and 
average predicted costs and to give more structure to the estimated effects, we also examined 
differences between the intervention and comparison groups in discrete choice models of plan 
selection. As a point of departure for this analysis, consider selecting a plan at random, which is 
equivalent to a discrete choice model with coefficients of zero on explanatory variables. The 
probability of plan selection from among 54 plans would be 1/54 = 0.019. To examine the 
probability of selecting plans of different prices, we formulated a conditional logit model for 26 
 
individual i and plan j estimated using comparison group data only and controlling for individual 
fixed effects (  ), predicted cost (   ), and predicted cost squared, based on the indirect utility 
function in equation (5), with utility (   
  ) and an error term (   ).
17 
(5)    
               
               
Results using that model estimate the predicted probability of choosing a plan in 2007 with the 
same price as that actually selected was 0.025, indicating some sensitivity to price. 
We then enriched this basic model, to examine any effect of being the lowest-cost plan 
(beyond what would be predicted by cost alone) and to analyze differences between the 
intervention and comparison groups in the sensitivity of plan selection to cost in general and to 
the lowest-cost plan in particular. The enriched model added an intervention group indicator (  ) 
and interactions of that indicator with predicted cost and predicted cost squared, an indicator for 
being the lowest-cost plan for that individual (   ), and the interaction of lowest-cost plan with 
the intervention group indicator—as well as 2006 baseline plan choice (   ) and plan fixed 
effects (  ), which improve precision of the estimates and also cause plans selected by fewer than 
2 individuals in the sample to drop out of this analysis. That model is based on the indirect utility 
function in equation (6); all explanatory variables in the model were known at the time of 
random assignment.  
(6)    
               
                             
                                      
We conducted three versions of the analysis based on this equation: plan choices in 2007 for the 
full sample of 2007 follow-up survey respondents, plan choices in 2007 for the sample of 2008 
                                            
17 We also experimented with modeling the effects of price more and less flexibly. The quadratic specification was 
selected because of its parsimony, fit to the data, and robustness to outliers. 27 
 
follow-up survey respondents, and plan choices in 2008 for the full sample of 2008 follow-up 
survey respondents. 
The results for all three versions indicate that the intervention group is significantly more 
sensitive to cost than the comparison group (see Table V). For the intervention group, the 
estimates for the first version of the analysis imply that a twenty-five percent decrease in 
predicted cost (say from $2120 to $1590, or from the 2007 average cost of the plan chosen in 
2006 to roughly the average of the lowest-cost plans in 2007—with marginal effects calculated 
as the sum of 1000 changes of 51.1 cents each) increased the odds of plan selection by 2.7. That 
is, it increased the probability of selection from 0.025 to 0.070. If that lower cost plan was also 
the lowest-cost plan, the estimated odds ratio was 8.2, and the probability of selection further 
rose to 0.27. In the comparison group, a twenty-five percent decrease in predicted cost increased 
the probability of plan selection only from 0.025 to 0.040. If the lower cost plan was also the 
lowest-cost plan, the probability of selection further rose only from 0.040 to 0.062 in the 
comparison group. The test of whether the coefficient on the interaction term of the differential 
effect of the lowest-cost plan in the intervention group relative to the comparison group was 
equal to zero generated a p-value of 0.09. A joint test of whether the coefficients on the cost and 
cost-squared interactions terms were equal to zero also yielded a p-value of 0.09, while the joint 
test of whether the coefficients on all three cost interactions terms were zero yielded a p-value of 
less than 0.005. This evidence is consistent with the effect of changes in the choice environment 
working through both increased sensitivity to the entire vector of costs for all plans and in 
particular to the lowest-cost plan. 
The estimates for prediction of 2008 plan selection in the third version of the analysis show 
that the interactions of cost with the intervention were somewhat smaller and the impact of the 28 
 
lowest-cost plan was somewhat larger than for 2007 plan selection. These results imply that a 
twenty-five percent decrease in predicted cost in 2007 and being the lowest-cost plan in 2007 
increased the estimated odds ratio to 9.9, i.e. the probability of selection in 2008 rose from 0.025 
to 0.40. These results are very similar to those from the second version of the analysis, for 2007 
plan selection limited to individuals for whom we observe 2008 data, where a twenty-five 
percent decrease in predicted cost and being the lowest-cost plan increased the probability of 
selection from 0.025 to 0.38. That is, the 2007 cost information provided in the intervention 
continued to have an effect of essentially the same magnitude on 2008 plan selection. 
 
VI.E. Impacts on Subgroups 
As discussed earlier, our sample was more educated, less satisfied with their baseline plans, 
and had higher dollar value of potential saving from switching to the lowest-cost plan than a 
national sample would have had. To examine the sensitivity of our results to these factors, we 
examined impacts within subgroups by education, plan satisfaction, and potential savings. We 
also examined the subgroups of people in baseline plans with small and large insurer market 
shares, and in baseline plans with basic versus enhanced coverage.
18 
Education. Our sample is quite highly educated, but estimated impacts for non-college 
graduates are actually larger than for college graduates, and for both subgroups the null 
hypothesis of no effect can be rejected at the 5 percent level of significance (see Table VI). 
These results are consistent with the notion that any limits in comprehending information by 
less-educated groups are offset by the marginal value of information to these groups.  
                                            
18 These analyses were exploratory. Under the null hypothesis of no impact of the intervention on consumer cost, the 
probability that the maximum t-statistic among the 20 comparisons examined in this section would be 1.96 or higher 
in absolute value is much greater than 5 percent. The hypothesis testing throughout this paper treats each 
comparison separately, and does not adjust for multiple comparisons. 29 
 
Plan Satisfaction. The proportion of our sample that rated their 2006 baseline plan as fair or 
poor is much higher than that in national samples (including our telephone survey and data from 
Medicare) who say they were neither satisfied or dissatisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, or very 
dissatisfied with their plans. Our sample probably had a high proportion dissatisfied with their 
plans because they were the people willing to volunteer to participate in our study about drug 
plan choice. The impacts are larger for the more dissatisfied subgroup (although imprecisely 
estimated), but quite substantial (and statistically significantly different from zero) even for those 
who rated their 2006 plan good or better—indicating that the results were not driven primarily by 
the dissatisfaction of participants with their plans. 
Potential Savings. The potential savings from switching to the lowest-cost plan was greater 
in our sample in dollars and similar in percentage terms to a national sample. The impacts in 
dollars for those with potential savings less than $400 were much smaller (although statistically 
significantly different from zero) than for those with greater potential savings. The impacts in 
relative terms were 0.052 and 0.075 log points for those two groups, respectively. These results 
suggest that the impact in percentage terms for a sample with nationally representative potential 
savings would probably have been only slightly smaller than that estimated for the full 2007 
Wisconsin follow-up survey sample.  
Insurer Market Share. We had initially speculated that individuals with relatively low 
knowledge of drug plans and drug costs might have placed a high weight on name-recognition 
and popularity, as potential signals of quality, and had chosen insurers with high enrollment in 
their plans in 2006. (For example, the plan with the highest national enrollment in 2006 was co-
branded by AARP, formerly the American Association of Retired Persons.) We hypothesized 
that when the intervention made personalized cost information available to individuals in these 30 
 
plans, they would be relatively more likely to switch plans. We found the opposite result. 
Individuals in plans with insurer market share of less than 15 percent were more likely to 
respond to the intervention by switching plans and enjoyed greater cost savings. Ex-post, the 
results are more consistent with the idea that large market share plans attracted members who 
highly valued a trusted brand or other non-cost attributes and were relatively less sensitive to 
personalized cost information. 
Benefit Type. The impact on switching by benefit type was essentially the same—about 11 
percentage points. The rate of switching from enhanced plans to enhanced plans was similar in 
the intervention and comparison groups, but the rate of switching from enhanced to basic plans 
was much higher in the intervention group. The impact on predicted consumer cost in log points 
was similar for those with basic and enhanced plans at baseline. The higher level of predicted 
consumer cost among people with enhanced plans at baseline translated into larger impacts in 
dollars. In sum, the intervention resulted in lower costs among people with both benefit types at 
baseline. For those with enhanced plans at baseline, those lower costs appear to have been 
primarily the result of switching to basic plans. 
 
VI.F. Reduction of Comparison Friction and Stated Preferences 
To obtain supplemental evidence about how individuals respond to a reduction in comparison 
friction, we presented seniors with several sets of plan characteristics including those of the plan 
they had chosen for themselves and asked them to indicate which they preferred. Following a 
technique developed by Bernartzi and Thaler (2002), our 2008 follow-up survey asked seniors to 
evaluate the choice between several pairs of unnamed drug plans based on cost measures, plan 
size, and Medicare quality ratings. In these questions, the cost information was personalized 31 
 
using the information they had provided about medication use in the 2006 baseline survey and 
was similar to the information that the intervention group had received via the Medicare print-
out; the enrollment and quality information were new.  
When seniors in the comparison group compared their 2007 plan to their 2006 plan (among 
those who had changed plans during those years), 61 percent did not select their 2007 plan. 
When seniors who had not chosen the lowest-cost plan in 2007 were asked to compare their 2007 
plan to the lowest-cost plan at that time, 63 percent of the comparison group did not select their 
2007 plan. This evidence shows how a reduction in comparison friction (that is, providing 
personalized information about the unnamed plans) shifted stated preferences away from the 
actual choices, which is consistent with the substantial impact such a reduction had on actual 
consumer choices as observed in our field experiment. For the intervention group the analogous 
results were that 52 percent did not select their 2007 plan over the lowest-cost plan and 16 
percent did not select their 2007 plan over their 2006 plan (among those who switched plans), 
indicating that the shift in stated preferences away from the actual choices was smaller among 
the intervention group for which comparison friction had been previously reduced during 2006 
open enrollment when actual choices were made. 
 
VII. DISCUSSION 
We interpret the results of our field experiment to indicate that an intervention which reduced 
comparison friction had a substantial impact on consumer choices, as it increased the percentage 
who switched plans from 17 percent to 28 percent and reduced predicted consumer cost by about 
$100 per person in our Wisconsin sample. Our examination of the choice environment found that 
information to facilitate comparisons was accessible at quite low cost (say, by calling 1-800-32 
 
Medicare), but that only 18 percent of individuals nationally had ever used personalized cost 
information. Why didn’t people seek out and use the available information? 
One potential reason people may not have used this information is that the gains are not as 
large as they appear. Suppose that individuals face high costs from the act of switching plans. 
The net gains from switching are then smaller than the cost savings alone. This means that the 
benefits of undertaking comparative research will be lower. Put simply, high switching costs 
would make it less valuable to investigate options than our cost savings would imply. However, 
consider the implications if it were the case that essentially all the potential savings from the 
intervention were offset by switching costs. Say that 17 percent of individuals would have 
switched if they had been assigned to the comparison group, and therefore would have saved 
enough to compensate them for switching costs without the intervention; thus, in this case where 
potential savings are essentially offset by switching costs there would be no effect on potential 
savings for these individuals because the intervention did not cause them to switch or increase 
switching costs. Then the intervention caused only 10 percent of individuals to switch plans. In 
this case then the overall effect of $103 per person in potential savings from receiving a letter 
would have been a combination of no effect on 90 percent of individuals and $1030 per person 
caused to switch. Since the act of switching itself could be accomplished in a phone call, this 
case seems implausible and we conclude such switching costs were very unlikely to have fully 
offset the potential savings from the intervention. Switching costs less than $100 per person 
caused to switch seem more plausible.  
Individuals may have expected the costs of understanding the forms and adjusting to the 
procedures of a new plan to be higher than the costs directly related to the act of switching. That 
uncertainty is a form of comparison friction that our intervention—which focused on premiums 33 
 
plus out-of-pocket expenditures—did not reduce. If individuals had greater knowledge of these 
factors for their current plan and did not have an effective way to learn about them for other 
plans, then again the net benefits of alternative choice would have been lower and comparative 
research would have been less likely to be worthwhile. These factors probably contributed to the 
low use of personalized cost information. 
In our view, a key reason people did not seek personalized comparative information was that 
they had biased expectations about how much they could save from switching plans. We asked 
participants in the comparison group during our 2007 follow-up interview how much they 
thought they could save if they had chosen the least expensive plan. Of those who could give an 
estimate, more than 70 percent gave an underestimate, and the average underestimate was more 
than $400. Because they thought the value of comparative research was going to be low, they did 
not undertake it. 
Biased expectations about costs may have combined with confirmation and status-quo biases 
(the tendency to stick with one’s existing opinions and choices), procrastination, limited 
attention, and small transaction costs to generate high rates of reported satisfaction and low rates 
of change. Our intervention, while modest, challenged these tendencies by altering price and 
market perceptions, countering confirmation bias (by showing the savings available), and 
providing an alternative default (the lowest-cost plan). Our results suggest that the mechanisms 
underlying the intervention impact increased sensitivity to plan cost in general, and to the lowest-
cost plan highlighted in the letter in particular.  
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VIII. DIRECTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
This study highlights four areas for further research. One is very concrete work on the design 
of clear, actionable information about Medicare drug plans or other health insurance coverage 
choices. Our work shows the potential for information to have an effect, although the study 
intervention incorporated multiple features including partnership with a trusted hospital, the 
priming effect of an in-person interview, a behaviorally sensitive letter, the full Medicare print-
out, and a mailing that both communicated personalized information about potential savings and 
raised general awareness about the potential for savings and the nature of the variation among 
plans. Additional work could unbundle these effects, with potential implications for the design of 
larger scale programs, and could explore the effects of quality as well as cost information. Tools 
for creating more sophisticated price information could also be developed that would 
incorporate, for example, forecasts of changes in drug use, rather than simply assume that next 
year’s use will be the same as the previous year’s use. 
Another area for further research is the role of product and information markets in reducing 
comparison friction. It is striking that, despite the apparent value of personalized comparative 
information, few third parties emerged to provide it, or even to highlight its potential value and 
steer seniors towards Medicare and its local partners. The actual provision of information may 
have been impeded by CMS regulations that constrained the role of third parties and by the effort 
involved in working with seniors one-on-one, although third parties with access to drug histories 
can provide personalized information relatively efficiently. Among the challenges in facilitating 
an expanded role for third parties would be the need to minimize the potential for plans to 
capture the market for advice, to respect individual privacy, to provide information that balanced 
cost and other considerations, and to hold beneficiaries’ well-being as the greatest value. 35 
 
Possibilities to explore could be one-on-one counseling and the ability for beneficiaries and their 
advisors to manually update an automatically generated drug list. 
A third area involves the potential response of insurance firms to broader provision of 
personalized price information. For example, if the information provided assumed last year’s 
drug use is the same as next year’s drug use, then firms would have strong incentives to cut 
prices on drugs used for short periods and increase prices on drugs used for long periods to 
encourage individuals to perceive their costs to be lower than they would actually be. In contexts 
of increased price salience, there would also be greater incentives for firms to cut costs which 
could lead to lower overall quality of service. 
A fourth area for more conceptual research is the interaction between comparison friction 
and various forms of market failure at both the theoretical and the more practical level. In the 
case of Medicare drug plans, the private and public optima may differ, and comparison friction 
may actually counteract market failure by reducing the extent of adverse selection and 
contributing to the success of the voluntary insurance market. Market functioning could be 
harmed if all plans with more than basic coverage attract only those for whom those plans are 
least costly (with these plans then becoming too expensive and being dropped), or if all 
individuals chose one low-cost provider who then obtained enough market power to keep out 
new entrants and also set monopolistic prices in future periods.  
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TABLE I 
Information on Choices from a Nationally Representative Sample, 2007 
    
A. Knowledge of plans    
Knew different plans were better for different people     0.82 
Knew one could only change plans during open enrollment    0.74 
Knew that not all plans have a deductible    0.37 
Knew plans have different co-payments for generics    0.55 
    
B. Plan satisfaction and switching    
At least somewhat satisfied with 2006 plan    0.85 
Switched plans from 2006 to 2007    0.10  
    
C. Information source about plans    
Read at least some of Annual Notice of Change    0.57 
Ever reviewed mailings for plan choice    0.53 
Ever had in-person contact for plan choice    0.14 
Ever had phone contact for plan choice    0.07 
Ever used internet for plan choice    0.04 
Ever reviewed side-by-side comparison for choice    0.34 
Ever reviewed personalized information for choice    0.18 
    
Sample size    348 
 
Notes. Data are from a phone survey of Medicare beneficiaries over age 65 who were enrolled in 
stand-alone Medicare prescription drug plans, as described in section IV.A. The Annual Notice of 
Change is a mailing from the current plan describing changes in that plan for the coming year. 40 
 
TABLE II 
Baseline Characteristics for 2007 Wisconsin Follow-up Survey Respondents 
 Comparison  Intervention  Difference 
  (1) (2) (3) 
      
Female  0.63 0.64 0.01 
(0.05) 
Married 0.67  0.63  -0.04 
(0.05) 
High school graduate   0.94  0.95  0.01 
(0.02) 
College  graduate  0.47 0.48 0.01 
(0.05) 
Post-college graduate  0.20  0.16  -0.05 
(0.04) 
Age  70+  0.78 0.85 0.07 
(0.04) 
Age 75+  0.45  0.56  0.11* 
(0.05) 
4+  Medications  0.61 0.66 0.04 
(0.05) 
7+  Medications  0.29 0.33 0.05 
(0.05) 
2006 plan fair or poor  0.26  0.35  0.09* 
(0.05) 
Predicted consumer cost of baseline plan in 2007  2126  2113  -12 
(175) 
Cost of lowest-cost plan minus baseline plan in 2007  -520  -533  -13 
(62) 
Average percentile rank of baseline plan in predicted 
2007 consumer cost 
37 41  4 
(3) 
 
Notes. Data are from a sample of University of Wisconsin Hospital patients, as described in section 
IV.D. Sample size is 197 in the comparison group and 209 in intervention group. Standard errors are 
in parentheses. * = p-value < 0.05 41 
 
 TABLE III 
Regression Coefficients In Models of Plan Switching and Consumer Cost  
for 2007 Wisconsin Follow-up Survey Respondents 




b   ln(Y
s/Y
b) 













Female   -0.023 
(0.045) 
   -34 
(41) 
   0.008 
(0.019) 
Married   0.107* 
(0.045) 
   -72 
(41) 
   -0.013 
(0.019) 
High school graduate     -0.044 
(0.093) 
   -45 
(84) 
   -0.005 
(0.039) 
College graduate    0.048 
(0.048) 
   20 
(43) 
   0.001 
(0.020) 
Post-college graduate    -0.084 
(0.062) 
   37 
(56) 
   0.029 
(0.026) 
Age 70+    -0.039 
(0.060) 
   41 
(54) 
   0.054* 
(0.025) 
Age 75+    0.079 
(0.048) 
   -49 
(43) 
   -0.032 
(0.020) 
4+ Medications    -0.054 
(0.050) 
   -23 
(45) 
   -0.000 
(0.021) 
7+ Medications    0.116* 
(0.052) 
  -112* 
(47) 
   -0.008 
(0.022) 
2006 plan fair or poor    0.097* 
(0.045) 
   -55 
(41) 
   -0.010 
(0.019) 
 
Notes. Estimates are from linear regression based on equation (4), as described in the text. Y
s is the 
2007 predicted consumer cost of the plan selected for 2007. Y
b is that cost for the baseline plan that 
had been selected in 2006. Sample size is 406. Standard errors are in parentheses. * = p-value < 0.05 
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TABLE IV 
Intervention Impacts for 2008 Wisconsin Follow-up Survey Respondents, by Outcome 
  
A. Consumer costs in dollars   
   Predicted 2007 consumer cost (2007 plan)  -111*  
(48) 
   Actual 2007 consumer cost (2007 plan)  -137  
(217) 
   Predicted 2008 consumer cost (2008 plan)  -93  
(169) 
   Predicted 2009 consumer cost (2008 plan)  -159 
(170) 
  
B. Quality   
   Proportion dissatisfied with quality, non-cost features  0.032 
(0.033) 




Notes. All estimates are of the coefficient on the intervention indicator from linear regression based 
on equation (4), as described in the text, using the same vector of covariates as in Table III. Costs are 
differences from Y
b, the predicted 2007 consumer cost of the 2006 baseline plan. Predicted 2007 
costs are based on drugs reported in the baseline 2006 survey. Predicted 2008 and 2009 costs are 
based on drugs reported in the 2008 follow-up survey. Sample size is 285 in rows 1-3, 241 in row 4, 
and 302 in rows 5-6. Standard errors are in parentheses. * = p-value < 0.05 43 
 
TABLE V 
Conditional Logit Analysis of Plan Selection for Wisconsin Follow-up Survey Respondents 
  2007 Plan  2007 Plan  2008 Plan 
  (1) (2) (3) 





























β5: 2007 (consumer cost/10,000)














N 12719  7101  7101 
Sample limited to 2008 follow-up survey 
respondents 
No Yes Yes 
     
p-value on H0: β4 = β5=  0  0.09 0.41 0.15 
p-value on H0: β4 = β5 = β6 = 0  0.00  0.02  0.00 
 
Notes. Conditional logit models estimated with individual fixed effects, as in equation (6). Additional 
coefficients not shown in the table were estimated for the 2006 choice and for each plan; the 
estimation sample is therefore limited to plans selected by at least 2 individuals in the sample and to 
individuals choosing a plan selected by at least two individuals. 7 observations with predicted 
consumer costs > $20k were dropped. Column 1 uses the 2007 follow-up survey respondents, with 
401 individuals, 32 plans, and 113 missing cost observations. Columns 2 and 3 use the 2008 follow-
up survey respondents, with 265 individuals, 27 plans, and 54 missing cost observations. Standard 
errors are in parentheses. * = p-value < 0.05. 
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TABLE VI 




Impact on predicted cost 
  
N 
 Comparison  Intervention    Dollars  Log  points     
 (1)  (2)    (3)  (4)    (5) 
              
A.  Education            










            
B. Satisfaction rating of 2006 plan               










            
C. Dollar potential savings               










            
D. Insurer share of sample in 2006               










            
E. Benefit type in 2006 baseline               






  (with or without gap coverage) 






Notes. All subgroups are defined on characteristics known prior to random assignment. Dollar 
potential savings = predicted 2007 consumer cost of 2006 plan - predicted consumer cost of least 
expensive plan in 2007. ~ = p-value < 0.05 on difference between columns 1 and 2. Columns 3 and 4 
are estimated with regression adjustment based on equation (4) using the models in Table III 
(columns 4 and 6, respectively) estimated separately for each subgroup. Standard errors are in 
parentheses.* = p-value < 0.05. 
 
 





EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE FROM MEDICARE DRUG PLANS 
 




This appendix consists of three parts: 
A.  Potential cost savings from plan switching by benefit type 
B.  Intervention impacts assuming some participants were not affected 
C.  Examples of materials used in the intervention 
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A. Potential cost savings from plan switching by benefit type 
 
Using data from the baseline survey on drugs taken in 2006, the average predicted consumer 
savings from switching to the lowest-cost plan in 2007 of any benefit type was $527. Those 
savings from switching to the lowest-cost plan of the same benefit type as the individual had in 
2006 ranged from $386 to $464 (see Table A-1).  
We also examined information on drugs actually taken in 2007 from our 2008 follow-up 
survey. The average actual savings from switching to the lowest-cost plan in 2007 of any benefit 
type was $487. Those savings from switching to the lowest-cost plan of the same benefit type as 
the individual had in 2006 ranged from $337 to $392.  
The average consumer cost among all 2007 basic plans was $2334. In comparison to the 
lowest-cost basic plan for each individual, the 27 other basic plans had predicted consumer costs 
$705 greater on average. 
 
TABLE A-1. Average Difference in Cost between Baseline Plan and Lowest-Cost 2007 Plan 
  Dollars     Percentile Rank 
 Potential  Actual    Potential  Actual 
 (1)  (2)    (3)  (4) 
Among Basic Plans  -386  -337    38  35 
Among Enhanced Plans Without Gap Coverage  -429  -391    43  37 
Among Enhanced Plans With Gap Coverage  -464  -392    50  49 
Among All Plans  -527  -487    39  37 
 
Notes. The baseline plan is the plan in which the individual was enrolled in 2006. The dollar 
difference is the cost in 2007 of lowest-cost plan minus that of the baseline plan. The percentile rank 
the rank of the cost of the lowest-cost plan minus the baseline plan (where zero provided the most 
savings and 100 provided the least savings). The sample for rows 1-3 is limited to plans of the same 
type as the baseline plan. The sample size for potential costs was 224, 73, 109, and 406 for rows 1-4 
respectively in columns 1 and 3; for actual costs it was 155, 58, 85 and 298 for those rows in 
columns 2 and 4.    47 
 
B. Intervention impacts assuming some participants were not affected 
 
The intervention impacts on predicted consumer cost discussed in the main text are intent-to-
treat estimates which compare the outcomes for all members of the intervention group to those of 
the comparison group. However, the change in predicted consumer cost is zero by definition for 
individuals who did not switch plans. Thus, the intent-to-treat estimates average together impacts 
on those potentially affected by the intervention with a large proportion of zeros for those not 
affected. This section explores how different assumptions about the proportion of the sample not 
affected scales up the point estimates and standard errors of those who were potentially affected. 
Define A as an indicator of being potentially affected by the intervention, where A involves 
the counterfactual and cannot be directly observed. Define D as an observed indicator for 
switching plans, and Z as an indicator for assignment to the intervention group. Define Y as the 
difference in predicted consumer cost of the plan selected for 2007 and the baseline plan in 2006, 
Y1 as the potential outcome if an individual were assigned to the intervention group, Y0 as the 
potential outcome if an individual were assigned to the comparison group. The causal effect of 
the intervention is then Y1-Y0. 
There was a causal effect for any individual who would have chosen a plan with a different 
predicted consumer cost in the intervention group than in the comparison group. These situations 
included having the intervention cause someone to switch to a lower cost plan (Y1<0; Y0=0), 
having the intervention cause someone who was going to choose a more expensive plan to not 
switch (Y1=0; Y0>0), and other cases (anytime Y1 ≠ Y0). A special case was when someone 
would not switch plans regardless of the intervention, so there was no effect on cost. The upper 
bound on the probability of this special case occurred when everyone who switched plans in one 48 
 
group would have switched if assigned to the other group (1- max{E[D | Z=1], E[D | Z=0]}). The 
lower bound on the probability of this special case occurred when no one who switched plans in 
one group would have switched if assigned to the other group (1- {E[D | Z=1] + E[D | Z=0]}). 
Intuitively, we can use the lower bound on the fraction of zeros included in the estimate of the 
average cost change for the entire intervention group versus the comparison group to calculate a 
lower bound on the average cost change for those who potentially were affected by the 
intervention. This bound is based on the derivation in equation (B1).
19 
 
(B1)   E[Y1 | Z=1] – E[Y0 | Z=0] 
 =    E[Y1-Y0] 
 =  E[Y1-Y0 | A=1]Pr(A=1) + E[Y1-Y0 | A=0]Pr(A=0) 
 =    E[Y1-Y0 | A=1]Pr(A=1) + 0 
  ≤ E[Y1-Y0 | A=1]{E[D | Z=1] + E[D | Z=0]}  
 
This approach is similar to that used by Imbens and Angrist (1994) to estimate a local 
average treatment effect (LATE), where those who did not comply and take up the treatment 
offer are assumed to have been unaffected. However, the approach used here is less restrictive. 
The exclusion restriction required for LATE, but not needed for (B1), is that people who would 
have switched plans even without the intervention would not be affected; relaxing this 
assumption is sometimes described as allowing effects on “always-takers.” LATE also involves 
an assumption of monotonicity, not needed for (B1), where the intervention only encourages 
switching; relaxation of this assumption is sometimes referred to as allowing “defiers.” We can 
now calculate an expression based for a lower bound on the average cost change for those who 
were potentially affected by the intervention, shown in equation (B2). 
                                            
19 The first line of equation uses the definition of potential outcomes. The second line uses the independence of 
potential outcomes from randomly assigned groups. The third line uses the definition of conditional expectation. The 
fourth line uses the definition of A, where Y1-Y0= 0 when A=0. The fifth line uses the lower bound described in the 




 | Z=1]- E[Y
 | Z=0]} / {E[D | Z=1] + E[D | Z=0]} 
 
In this paper’s application, the lower bound point estimates and standard errors simply rescale 
the intent-to-treat estimates by 1/{E[D | Z=1] + E[D | Z=0]}, or 2.2 (see Table B-1). There is a 
small amount of negative covariance between the estimation of average cost differences and 
switching rates, and accounting for this slightly reduces the standard errors; for simplicity, this 
adjustment is not included in the results. 
Our intuition is that the exclusion restriction does not hold in this application but 
monotonicity probably does. The exclusion restriction would be violated if those in the 
comparison group who would have switched without the intervention nevertheless had their 
predicted consumer cost affected by the intervention. Monotonicity would be violated if the 
intervention caused some people to not switch who would have otherwise switched. If we did not 
impose the exclusion restriction but assume monotonicity holds—that is, allow effects on 
“always-takers” but assume no “defiers”—then then we would obtain treatment-on-treated 
results from rescaling by 1/E[D | Z=1] instead of 1/{E[D | Z=1] + E[D | Z=0]}, as in equation 
(B3). 
 
(B3) E[Y1-Y0|A=1]  = {E[Y
 | Z=1]- E[Y
 | Z=0]} / E[D | Z=1] 
 
Estimates of treatment-on-treated effects based on (B3) generate point estimates about 3.6 times 
larger than the lower bound on the potentially affected group based on (B2). 
The regression-adjusted estimate of the treatment-on-treated effect for the full sample is $369 
(see Table B-1). That turns out to be very similar to the non-experimental estimate that compares 
the savings of those who switched plans in the intervention group (who had potential savings that 
averaged $469) to those who switched plans in the comparison group (who had potential savings 50 
 
that averaged $97), where the difference is $372. Because the potential savings for non-switchers 
is zero by construction, if there were no regression adjustment and the switching rates in the two 
groups were the same then treatment-on-treated estimate would exactly equal the difference 
between switchers in potential savings; in this application, the regression adjustment and lower 
switching rate in the comparison group roughly offset each other. 
 
REFERENCE 
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TABLE B-1. Intervention Impacts in the Wisconsin 2007 Follow-up Survey  
Assuming Some Participants Were Not Affected, by Subgroups 
  Lower bound  
impact on predicted cost 
 Treatment-On-Treated 
impact on predicted cost 
  
N 
  Dollars  Log points    Dollars  Log points     
 (1)  (2)    (3)  (4)    (5) 
              
A.  Education            


















            
B. Satisfaction rating of 2006 plan               


















            
C. Dollar potential savings               


















            
D. Insurer share of sample in 2006               


















            





















            
F.  All            










Notes. Estimates are with regression adjustment using the models in Table III, columns 4 and 6, 
estimated separately for each subgroup, and modified as follows: columns (1) and (2) are based on 
equation (B2), and multiply the estimates by 1/(0.282+0.168); columns (3) and (4) are based on 
equation (B3), and multiply the estimates by 1/0.282. All subgroups are defined on characteristics 
known prior to random assignment. Dollar potential savings = predicted 2007 consumer cost of 2006 
plan - predicted consumer cost of least expensive plan in 2007. Standard errors are in parentheses. * 
= p-value < 0.05.   52 
 
C. Examples of materials used in the intervention 
 
  Exhibit C1: Comparison Group Letter 
  Exhibit C2: Intervention Group Letter 
  Exhibit C3: Booklet provided – The New Medicare Prescription Drug Coverage: Using 
the Medicare Prescription Drug Plan Finder 








Dear UWHC Patient: 
 
 
Thank you for participating in our Medicare Part D prescription drug plan study.  I hope the 
information you received on the phone recently was helpful to you. 
 
As you were told, you can find additional information regarding the plans available to you by 
accessing the Medicare Prescription Drug Plan Finder web site at: 
http://www.medicare.gov/MPDPF/Public/Include/DataSection/Questions/SearchOptions.asp. 
 
You can use the enclosed document from AARP to assist you in using the web site. 
 
Please remember that later this coming spring, we will call again to find out what plan you chose 
and how satisfied you are with your choice; that call will take about 10 minutes. 
 
If you have any questions or concerns about this study or the information you have received, 








Lee Vermeulen, R.Ph., M.S., FCCP 
Director, Center for Drug Policy 
UW Hospital and Clinics 
Clinical Associate Professor 
UW- Madison School of Pharmacy 
 
 







«City», «State»  «Zip» 
 
 
Dear UWHC Patient: 
 
Thank you for participating in our Medicare Part D prescription drug plan study.  I hope the information 
you received on the phone recently was helpful to you. 
 
Please find enclosed a summary of the information that you received during the interview.  As you can 
see from the Medicare web site, you may have an opportunity to save on your prescription drug costs by 
changing plans for 2007. 
 
The plan you reported being in for 2006:  «M_06_PLAN» 
The estimated cost of that plan for 2007:  $«ANNUAL__OF_PTS_CURRENT_PLAN_06» 
The lowest cost plan available to you for 2007:  «LEAST_EXPENSIVE_PLAN_07» 
The estimated cost of that plan for 2007:  $«ANNUAL__07» 
Your potential savings for 2007 if you choose 




Note that even if you have already chosen a plan for 2007, you can still change your mind and choose a 
different plan until December 31, 2006!  If you do choose to change plans, you can access the Medicare 
web site at: 
http://www.medicare.gov/MPDPF/Public/Include/DataSection/Questions/SearchOptions.asp 
 
Please remember that later this coming spring, we will call again to find out what plan you chose and 
how satisfied you are with your choice; that call will take about 10 minutes.  If you have any questions 
or concerns about this study or the information you have received, please feel free to contact me at 608-





Lee Vermeulen, R.Ph., M.S., FCCP 
Director, Center for Drug Policy 
UW Hospital and Clinics 
Clinical Associate Professor 
UW- Madison School of Pharmacy 
 601 E Street, NW
Washington, DC 20049
For more information about Medicare’s prescription drug
coverage, visit AARP’s website at www.aarp.org/medicarerx, 









Preparing for Your Drug Plan Search
Before using the Medicare Prescription Drug Plan Finder,
you should collect the following information (see work-
sheet on page 11):
1. A List of the Prescription Drugs You Take: 
• Name of each drug*
• Dosage or strength of the drug you take 
(e.g., 20 mg)
• Number of times you take each drug each day or
per week
*Prescription drugs are dispensed in a variety of ways—tablets,
capsules, patches, time-released, etc. Often this information is
entered in coded language on your pill container. The names of
some drugs may also be abbreviated because they are so long.
Thus, your pill container may not give you everything you need for
your drug list. It therefore might be a good idea to talk with your
pharmacist when making your list—and if you get all your drugs
from one place, your pharmacist may be willing to provide you
with a printout of your drug list.
2. Information about Your Current Insurance Coverage
(if any) such as a Medicare supplement, retiree cov-
erage, Medicare Advantage (managed care) plan, VA,
TRICARE, or FEHB.
For Help on the Computer:
• Ask a family member or friend to help you.
• Contact the State Health Insurance Assistance
Program (SHIP). Call 1-800-633-4227 to learn the
number for your state’s SHIP . SHIP trains volunteers to
help people with their Medicare issues. Most are
computer savvy. Or,
Current coverage
If you have VA, TRICARE, or
FEHB, your drug coverage
may already be as good as the
new Medicare Rx coverage.
Your medical plan provider
should have sent you infor-
mation by now about
whether your coverage is as
good as Medicare’s.
If you were in a Medicare
Advantage Plan with pre-
scription drug coverage prior
to 2006, your plan should
have informed you that you
would be enrolled in their
Medicare prescription drug
plan.
If you had retiree drug cov-
erage through a former
employer or union, or a
Medicare supplemental plan
with drug benefits, prior to
2006, you should have been
notified by your plan provider
if your coverage is as good as
Medicare’s drug coverage.
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Introduction
In this booklet you will find information about how to use the tools avail-
able to help you make a decision about a Medicare prescription drug plan.
For those who have access to a computer and/or assistance from a com-
puter user, Medicare has developed the Medicare Prescription Drug Plan
Finder. In this booklet you will find a step-by-step guide on how to do a
“General Search” of prescription drug plans. There are various other kinds of
searches that can be done, but our goal was to familiarize you with the tool
itself—enabling you to move on to other searches yourself later. For those
who do not have access to a computer and/or who are uncomfortable
working with this kind of a tool, there is also information about how to
enroll in a Medicare prescription drug plan using the telephone. Either way,
we hope you will explore the new Medicare prescription drug coverage
options available to you—to see if it will help you save on your drug costs.
Finally, if you need more information before making a final decision, see the
“Other resource information” column on page 9. 3
• If you dislike or have difficulty using a speech auto-
mated system, you can press zero (0) on your tele-
phone to bypass the automated system. This may or
may not get you to a customer service operator right
away—depending upon how busy they are. It’s impor-
tant to know, however, that calls are taken in the
order they are received—so hanging up and calling
back only puts you at the back of the line!
If You Do Have Computer Access:
Once you have gathered your drug information, you are ready to
begin your prescription drug plan search, using the Medicare
Prescription Drug Plan Finder. 
To keep your initial search simple, this tool focuses on “Stand
Alone” prescription drug plans associated with the traditional
Medicare fee-for-service program. By working through a “General
Search,” you will become better acquainted with the information
available through the Plan Finder.
To start your prescription drug plan search:
1. On the computer, go to the Internet, type:
www.medicare.gov, hit enter, and log onto the Medicare
website.
2. Click on Compare Medicare Prescription Drug Plans. 
3. Scroll down to where you see (in blue) Where Would
You Like to Begin? Then, where you see, Find a
Medicare Prescription Drug Plan, click on the orange
arrow to the right.
4. Scroll down to the lower half of the page until you see a
button that says General Search and click on that
button.
5. Enter your Zip Code in the box that is provided. Do
not hit enter.
Note: In some cases, when you enter your zip code, you will get
another box that asks you to select your county. Click on the drop
down arrow and select your county, then click on Continue. 
Extra Help for those
with limited income
Extra Help is available if your
income and assets are below
these figures:
• Income eligibility for Extra
Help is $14,355 (single) or
$19,245 (couple).*
• Asset eligibility is $11,500
(single) or $23,000
(couple).
If it looks like your income is
less than these figures, even if
you have some doubts, it is a
good idea to apply for this
benefit, since it could provide:
• Unlimited drug coverage
(no coverage gap).
• Greatly reduced (or even
zero) monthly premiums.
• Greatly reduced (or even
zero) annual deductible.
• Co-pays of $1 to $5 or 15%
of the cost of each drug—
depending on income and
asset levels.
*Income figures will go up for
2006.
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• Call your local Area Agency on Aging at 1-800-677-
1116 to learn which office is the closest to you.
If You Don’t Have Computer Access:
• Call MEDICARE at 1-800-633-4227. Customer service
representatives will walk you through the Plan Finder.
If you request it, they will send you a “Customized
Print on Demand” booklet of the prescription drug
plans that might work best for you. 
Tips for calling Medicare:
• Medicare’s toll-free number is currently available 24
hours a day, 7 days a week. Try to call during non-peak
hours such as evenings or weekends, and try to avoid
Monday mornings.
• You will need to have your list of drugs and dosages,
your Medicare card, your date of birth, and the date
you originally enrolled in Medicare (the date is on your
Medicare card) available when you call.
• Write down any specific questions you have before
calling, and check your questions off as they are
answered when you call.
• When you make the call, you may first get a “Speech
Automated System” (a computer) that will instruct you
to say your answers. If you decide to use this system,
you will need to speak slowly, distinctly, and loudly
enough for the computer to understand you. Also, try
to minimize any background noises that might make it
hard for you and the computer to hear.
• If the response from the Medicare automated system is
that you are not enrolled in a plan, it will ask you to
please check back later because Medicare is updating
its records daily. So if you have enrolled already, wait
about a week and call Medicare back. If you haven’t
enrolled yet, and want to get Medicare drug coverage,
you will need to make a choice and enroll in a plan.
Say: “Enroll.”
Tips on using the
Medicare Speech
Automated System
It will ask you a series of
questions about what kind of
information you need. The
basic questions you will need
to answer are as follows:
1. If you are calling about
the new Medicare drug
coverage, say: “Drug
Coverage.”
2. For information on how
the new prescription drug
plans work, say: “Plan
Choices.” 
3. Do you have your
Medicare Card?
4. Please tell me your
Medicare Claim Number,
including any letters (it’s
on your Medicare card).
5. May I have your last
name, without spelling it? 
6. What is your date of birth?
7. What was the starting
date of your Medicare
coverage? (This is on your
Medicare card.)
8. Our records show that you
are... (enrolled or not
enrolled in Medicare pre-
scription drug plan).
9. If would like to speak with
an agent, you will need
your drug list and
Medicare card. Say:
“Agent.” This will bring a
customer service repre-
sentative from Medicare
on to the line.5
Note 3: If a particular drug does not appear on the Medicare Plan
Finder list, it is probably not covered by Medicare and you will have
to pay for the drug yourself—unless you qualify for another pro-
gram such as Medicaid or a state pharmacy assistance program
11.When you have completed entering your list of med-
ications, click on Continue with Selected Drugs.
12.Next click on Change/Update My Drug Dosage. This
is one of the most important steps in the whole
process!You will get a more precise plan comparison if
you take the time to enter exact dosages and quanti-
ties. For example, if two pills are taken per day, change
the 30-day quantity to 60. To change the dosage, click
the drop-down arrow to the right of the drug name,
and then click Update Dosage/Quantity to make sure
all your changes have been registered. You next need to
click on Continue with Selected Drugs.
13.Scroll down to Choose How You Want to View Your
Plan. Click on Continue to Plan List rather than Select
My Preferred Pharmacy. You will have another chance
to do this later. You will then see a screen titled Find a
Medicare Prescription Drug Plan. Scroll down to the
Prescription Drug Plan Comparison multi-colored
chart that gives you plans for the zip code you entered,
starting with the one that is estimated to be least
expensive overall calculated for 30-day supplies from
local “preferred” pharmacies (those that are in the
plan’s network). You still need to compare plans, how-
ever, because there are other factors to think about. 
Note: In order to view the information about the various plans, you
will click on the words in the column that are underlined (Plan
Information, Plan Name, # of Pharmacies, etc.). This will bring up
more detailed information about each plan. In order to move back
and forth between these columns, you should scroll down to the
bottom of the screen and click on the buttons that may say
Return to Personalized Search, Close Window, or Return to
Previous Page. You can also use your “back” button on your
computer in most cases to move back and forth between the
various windows.
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6. On the same page, scroll down and click on the box
that best describes your Current Prescription
Coverage. If you don’t know, click “None of the
Above.”
7. On that same page, scroll down and select “yes” or
“no” to the question Eligible or Qualify For
Additional Help, then scroll down and click the
Continue button. (If you are not sure if you will
qualify for the Extra Help, check the eligibility infor-
mation in the box in the shaded area on page 3.)
8. This will bring up the next window Decide on Your
Plan Options. At the bottom of the page, click on
Choose a Drug Plan Type.
9. Near the bottom of the page, click on the gray button
Search for Medicare Prescription Drug Plans.
10.Scroll down to Enter Your Medications, and click on
the gray button. Using the list of drugs you made ear-
lier, type the name of your drug in the box that
appears, and click Search for Drug. Scroll down to
Review Your Drug List to see that drug name has been
entered. If you have more than one drug to enter, click
on Add Additional Drugs and enter the next drug.
Repeat for each drug used, clicking Add Selected Drug
to My List each time after typing in the name of your
drug. Don’t panic when the screen appears to go
blank—the computer is just doing its work.
Note 1: If you type the drug name incorrectly or just type in the
first few letters, the program will give you a drop-down screen
with a list of drugs to choose from that are close to what you’ve
entered—select the correct drug and then click on Add the Drug
to My List. You can also enter just the first letter of the drug
name (such as “L” for Lovastatin) and you will get a complete
listing of all drugs that start with that letter. If you find your drug
on this list, you then need to select it and click on Add the Drug
to My List. 
Note 2: When all your drugs are listed, click on the little box below
the list. This will remove the check mark (see explanation in the
shaded box) from the box that says: “Use lower cost generics
when available.”
Generic check box
When you enter a drug name,
the computer automatically
checks to see if a generic drug
is available. 
Generics will automatically
come up on your list of drugs
—unless you uncheck the box
first (below).
Because generics are usually
less expensive than their
brand name equivalents, the
computer will also factor the
generics listed into the plan
costs. Therefore, the cost
quotes might be misleading,
if you intend to stay with a
brand name as opposed to a
generic.
You will have another chance
to do this kind of cost com-
parison later, so we suggest
you uncheck the box at this
point in your search.7
• The cost for a 90-day mail order supply.
• If and when your costs are estimated to reach the
“gap in coverage” or catastrophic level, and your
estimated monthly cost during the “gap” period.
16.In the Select to Compare column, click in the boxes to
the left of the plan names (up to three at a time) you
are interested in, and then scroll down and click the
button that says Compare Three Plans. Repeat for
more comparisons.
17.In the # of Pharmacies column, click on the # to get a
list of the pharmacies that are preferred by that partic-
ular plan.
By now you should be getting a feel for how the Medicare
Prescription Drug Plan Finder works. There is a lot of
information available at your fingertips—but it takes a
little practice to become comfortable using it—so take
your time and don’t be afraid to explore some of the other
search possibilities available. There will be times when
“traffic” is heavy on the Plan Finder. You may have to try at
another non-peak time, but don’t get discouraged. As the
“traffic jam” begins to break up, you’ll have access when
you want it.
Some other things to be aware of when using
the Medicare Prescription Drug Plan Finder:
1. Restrictions on certain drugs—Watch for a single
asterisk (*) to the right of a drug name in the “View
Cost Details” page. It means there are special rules that
apply, such as:
• Prior Authorization: This means that you or your
doctor must obtain the plan’s approval before it will
cover a particular drug (often a high-priced one).
The physician generally has to document why this
specific medication is needed.
• Step Therapy: This is a variation of prior authoriza-
tion. It requires the physician to use a similar but
Exploring similar
drugs to treat a
particular condition
AARP has developed an
online consumer guide to
help you find the most effec-
tive and affordable drugs. The
guide provides unbiased
information on drug safety,
effectiveness, and cost. It’s
based upon an independent
review and  assessment of the
available medical evidence. 
The guide shows how the
most expensive drugs are not
necessarily the best, and that
consumers willing to consult
with their doctor or pharma-
cist, can often find similar
safe and effective lower cost
drugs. To learn more about
AARP’s prescription drug con-





14.Scroll down about halfway until you see a multi-col-
ored chart. Look for the heading More About this Plan. 
Then, starting in the Plan Information column on the
topmost plan, click on the Select Below arrow that will
provide a drop-down menu with the following selections: 
• Enroll in this Plan
• View Cost Details: This gives you what you need to
compare plans properly. Some of the things it
shows include: (see box to the right also)
> An estimate of your total annual costs
(including premiums, deductibles and co-pays)
for all of 2006.
> Your fixed costs —monthly premiums and
annual deductible (if any).
> Your co-pays in the initial coverage period.
> If or when you might reach the “gap in cov-
erage” and what your drugs will cost you when
you do.
• Lower My Cost Share: This is where you can check to
see what savings might be available through the use of
a similar drug or generic equivalent.
• View Notes: This will give you information about
whether the plan is regional or national, as well as
information about where you might obtain your drugs
(pharmacy networks, etc.)
15.In the Plan Name Column, click on the name of the
plan to get detailed information about your specific
drug costs, including:
• Your monthly premium and deductible (if any).
• Your specific co-pay or co-insurance for each drug
you listed earlier.
• The “tier” your drug(s) are in for that plan
(remember tiers won’t necessarily be the same for
all plans).
Getting the answers
you need from the
Medicare Rx Plan
Finder
What will my detailed cost be
under this plan?
See View Cost Details.
What are my 90-day mail
order options?
See View Cost Details.
Are there ways of paying less
under a prescription drug
plan? See Lower My Cost
Share.
How can I tell whether all my
drugs are covered?
See View Cost Details.
How can I tell what my drug
costs will be in the “gap in
coverage?” See View Cost
Details/Show Details or 
Plan Name/Show Details (if it
says Hide Details click on it to
bring up the Show Details).
Note: A Double Asterisk (**)—
to the right of a drug’s name
(in Show Details) means it is
not part of a plan’s preferred
drug list, or formulary, and
therefore will be more costly to
you.
How can I tell whether I can
get my prescription drugs in
other parts of the country
under this plan, if I’m trav-
eling? See View Plan Notes.
Which pharmacies can I go to
under this plan? Click on the
number in the # of
Pharmacies Column.9
5. Premiums and Deductibles: Keep in mind that some
plans will not require a premium or a deductible—but
you still need to compare total costs for the plan as a
whole to see which plan makes the most dollar sense.
While your premiums and deductible (if any) cannot
increase in the calendar year, your co-pays or co-insur-
ance may. Such changes, though not expected to
happen frequently, can raise or lower your estimated
annual drug costs.
6. Types of Medicare Plans:
• “Stand alone” plans that offer only drug coverage.
Such a plan may be for you if you wish to stay in
the traditional Medicare fee-for-service program for
other medical coverage.
• Medicare Advantage (MA) plans that cover both
medical services and prescription drugs. Such a
plan may be for you if you can accept restrictions
on your choice of health care providers, and you
prefer managed care.
7. Call and Confirm Plan Information: Prior to enrolling
in any prescription drug plan, it’s important to call the
Prescription Drug Plan sponsor (or check their web-
site) to confirm the information that you have gotten
from the Plan Finder. The plans are able to make
changes on a daily basis—and many have, as they try
to be more competitive with the plans they only saw
for the first time on November 15, 2005.
8. Changing Plans: Medicare beneficiaries who qualify
for Extra Help have the option of changing their pre-
scription drug plan at any time. If you do not qualify
for Extra Help you can change your plan once between
now and May 16, 2006. Thereafter, changes can be
made during the annual enrollment period which is
typically November 15 to December 31 of each year.
Other resource
information
On the AARP Medicare web-
site www.aarp.org/
medicarerx you will find a
host of helpful information
(in English and Spanish),
including:
The New Medicare Prescription
Drug Coverage:What You Need
to Know
The New Medicare Prescription
Drug Coverage: Extra Help for
People with Limited Incomes
The New Medicare Prescription
Drug Coverage: A Glossary of
Terms




The New Medicare Prescription
Drug Coverage: More
Information for People with
Medigap
The New Medicare Prescription
Drug Coverage: More
Information for People with
Retiree Coverage
The New Medicare Prescription
Drug Coverage: How to Ask the
Right Questions & Get the Most




more than the plan finder. On
their home page, click on
Other Resources for fact
sheets, things to consider, etc.
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less expensive “preferred” drug to treat a condition
before being allowed to use the one originally pre-
scribed.
2. Quantity Limits: This does NOT mean that your
supply of drugs will be cut off after a certain time—
or restricted to a particular number of prescriptions
per year. It does mean that your doctor must follow
your plan’s guidelines when prescribing drugs for a
current condition. If, for instance, your doctor writes a
prescription that falls outside your drug plan’s quantity
limit, he or she must get prior authorization from your
plan before the plan will agree to pay for the prescrip-
tion. For example, prescriptions for sleeping pills need
to be monitored very closely by your doctor and there-
fore most will have a quantity limit associated with
them. In other words, if the normal course of treat-
ment calls for a 10-day supply of pills, then your doctor
can’t write the prescription for more than that—unless
he or she has prior approval from the drug plan to do
so.
3. Co-payment/Coinsurance: This is the amount you pay
for each prescription after you have paid the
deductible. In some plans, you pay the same co-pay-
ment (a set amount) or coinsurance (a percentage of
the cost) for any prescription. In other plans, there
might be different levels or “tiers,” with different costs,
depending on which tier a particular drug is assigned.
Some plans may have co-payments for some drugs
and coinsurance for others.
4. “Tiered” co-payment levels: Typically, less expensive
drugs are assigned to lower tiers, with lower co-pay
amounts. Brand-name drugs may be further divided
into “preferred” and “non-preferred” tiers as well.
Further, some plans may dedicate another tier for less
common and/or very expensive drugs. With these
kinds of variations, it’s a good idea to compare not only
the monthly premium and annual deductible—but




Each plan has a formulary, or
its preferred list of drugs.
To do a Formulary Search, go
to www.medicare.gov, click
on Formulary Search. Enter
your state, then your list of
drugs. When the list of plans
is displayed, click on the
name of each plan to see in
which tier each of your drugs
falls. This won’t give you co-
pays, however, so you’ll need
to go to “View Cost Details”
(see page 6) for that.
Personalized Search:
Start at www.medicare.gov
again. Click on Compare
Medicare Prescription Drug
Plans. Click on Find a
Medicare Drug Plan. Enter
your personal information
in the boxes, then click on
Personalized Search. From
there, follow the same










Final Note: Protect yourself
against fraud
• Applying is free. The forms are free, and there’s plenty
of free help in your community to fill them out.
• Don’t give out bank or credit card account numbers.
You will have to give some personal information about
your income and resources if you apply for Extra Help,
but not your banking, checking or credit card informa-
tion!
• Talk to the right person. If you have sent information
to Social Security to apply for Extra Help, they may call
you, but if the caller asks for your Social Security
number, hang up! They probably aren’t from the Social
Security Administration!
• By law, Medicare plans cannot come to your door to
sell their product, unless you have invited them. If you
experience this kind of activity, contact your state
attorney general. Look in the blue pages of your tele-
phone directory for state government listings, then
look for “Attorney General.”
• Don’t be pressured. Companies can call you to tell
you about their drug plans, but they can’t sign you up
over the phone. In addition, organizations must:
• Comply with the National-Do-Not-Call Registry
• Honor “do not call again” requests, and
• Abide by federal and state calling hours.
• Take your time. You have until May 15 of this year
to enroll without incurring a late penalty.
List of Medications for
Medicare Plan Finder
Search
What I pay now
monthly for the
drugs I take
Plan 1 Plan 2 Plan 3
Monthly Premium $ $ $ $
Deductible $ $ $ $














Does this plan have a gap in coverage?
If so, when does the gap begin?
When does the gap end?
Can I use the plan at the pharmacy? Do I
have to go to a different pharmacy?
Does the plan give me discounts on all the
drugs I currently take?
If I currently buy a 90-day supply, what is the
price difference? Do I have to utilize mail order?
If I live in another state for part of the year,
can I get my drugs in that state?
Don’t
Give OutAARP is a nonprofit, nonpartisan membership
organization that helps people 50+ have
independence, choice and control in ways that
are beneficial and affordable to them and
society as a whole. We produce AARP The
Magazine, published bimonthly; AARP
Bulletin, our monthly newspaper; AARP
Segunda Juventud, our bimonthly magazine in
Spanish and English; NRTA Live & Learn, our
quarterly newsletter for 50+ educators; and
our website, www.aarp.org. AARP Foundation
is an affiliated charity that provides security,
protection, and empowerment to older
persons in need with support from thousands
of volunteers, donors, and sponsors. We have
staffed offices in all 50 states, the District of
Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin
Islands.
List of Medications for
Medicare Plan Finder
Search
What I pay now
monthly for the
drugs I take
Plan 1 Plan 2 Plan 3
Monthly Premium $ $ $ $
Deductible $ $ $ $














Does this plan have a gap in coverage?
If so, when does the gap begin?
When does the gap end?
Can I use the plan at the pharmacy? Do I
have to go to a different pharmacy?
Does the plan give me discounts on all the
drugs I currently take?
If I currently buy a 90-day supply, what is the
price difference? Do I have to utilize mail order?
If I live in another state for part of the year,
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•  • Monthly  Coverage  Number of  • 
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UA Medicare Part  $1,555 
D Rx Covg- Lower 
Silver Plan  this cost 
United American 





EnvisionRxPlus  $1,570 
Gold  Lower 







AARP  $1,597 
MedicareRx Plan  Lower 
- Enhanced  this cost 
UnitedHealthcare 




$39.90  $0.00  No gap  9 
coverage 
$26.10  $0.00  No gap 
coverage 
9 
$23.40  $0.00  No gap 
coverage 
9 
$31.70  $100.00  No gap 
coverage 
9 
$30.60  $265.00  No gap 
coverage 
9 
$69.00  $0.00  Generics  Il 
$44.00  $0.00  Generics  9 
f:l':'.  _,:,C 




~.  ~ . 
""L  -.  m - .­






$34.60  $0.00  No gap 
coverage 
9  - ­
2;; 







Blue MedicareRx  $1,607  $27.50  $250.00  No gap  9  - ­
Value  Lower  coverage 







Prescription  $1.609  $25.00  $265.00  No gap  9  - ­
Pathway Bronze  Lower  coverage 
Plan Reg 16  this cost 
Pennsylvania Life 





Blue MedicareRx  $1,626  $45.40  $0.00  Generics  9  - ­
~  Premier  Lower 







MedicareRx  $1,650  $47.40  $0.00  Generics  9  -
Rewards Premier  Lower 







Humana PDP  $1,801  $80.30  $0.00  Generics  9  - ­
Complete S5884­ Lower 
044  this cost 
Humana 









$29.30  $0.00  No gap 
coverage 
Z  - ­
1.,·'  .  ~  ,.  ~".  , 
NMHC Group  this cost 
Solutions 
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$24.50  $0.00  Nogap 
coverage 
~  B.
~''''''  , ','  L' ,.  ',. 







Humana PDP  $1,848  $23.50  $0.00  No gap  ~ 
Enhanced 55884­ Lower  coverage 
014  this cost 
Humana 


























$26.20  $265.00  No gap 
coverage 














$15.90  $265.00  No gap 
coverage 
~  •
'  ' 




WellCare  $2,085  $45.50  $0.00  Generics  9  -
Complete  Lower 
~- -, 
WellCare  this cost 





Humana PDP  $2,134  $14.80  $265.00  No gap  9 
Standard 55884­ Lower  coverage 
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074  this cost 
Humana 
Insurance 










$34.00  $265.00  No gap 
coverage 
2  • -
RxAmerica 





Advantage Star  $2,461  $29.30  $265.00  No gap  2  - ­
Plan by  Lower  coverage 
RxAmerica  this cost 





EnvisionRxPlus  $3,136  $45.00  $265.00  No gap  8  - ­
Standard  Lower  coverage 







Plans per page: I"u. 
t Compare up to 3 Plans _  (Clear Selections) 
~The organization that offers this plan offers at least one plan in all fifty states and the District of Columbia. 
Note: The specific plan(s) offered by this organization may differ from state to state. 
The drug costs displayed above are estimates based on your current drug use and preferred pharmacies. These 
estimates may vary based on the specific quantity, strength, and/or dosage of each medication, the order in 
which you purchase your prescriptions, and the pharmacy you use. You may wish to revise your Drug & 
Pharmacy List below in order to get the most accurate cost estimates. 
My Drug &. Pharmacy List 
Review the dosage and quantity information displayed below for each of your drugs and update if  necessary. 
If  you take more than one dose of the same drug, click "Add Doses." 
Note that if you change the strength of a drug using a dropdown menu in the "Drug Name" column, you then 
need to make sure the information in the "Quantity & Days Supply" column is still correct. 
My Drugs 
http://plancompare.medicare.gov/planComparison.asp?PDP=1&MAPD=1&cmbRowsPer...  12/19/2006 -- --
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Drug Name  Quantity/Days Supply  Actions 
I~o 
IL1SINOPRIL!AB 10rv1G mil 
IperMonth 
(30  i 
ITRIAMTER~NElHCT~(:AP  37~5-25  •  Iper~~~th  . it 
.  .. . .  -
My Pharmacies 
No pharmacies selected. Click the Change Pharmacy Selection button to add pharmacies. 
Selected Pharmacies  Remove 
Page Last Updated: October 31, 2006 
-TOP of page 
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